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I. Introduction
Ostensibly, international legal theory and international
relations theory are different academic worlds. International legal
theory involves unstructured musings about the sources of
international law and its enforceability. International relations
theory, on the other hand, considers the way states interact through
diplomacy or war.
On closer examination the sources and enforceability of
international law depend very much on the extent to which states
cooperate and what causes them to cooperate. The manner in
which states interact depends very much on the framework of rules
in which they operate, the framework of rules they seek to build,
and whether they view these frameworks as obligatory and just.
More generally, international legal and international relations
theorists have a shared interest in the pre-conditions for
international order and peaceful change since both groups want to
understand how binding, fair rules can be created to foster stability
and manage transitions.
Until now, the only way to appreciate this shared interest was
to identify leading theoretical pieces in international relations
journals and international law reviews, access and digest these
separately, and then construct some sort of synthesis. Even for the
skilled interdisciplinary scholar, this task was formidable.
Fortunately, Robert J. Beck, Anthony Clark Arend, and Robert D.
Vander Lugt (the Editors) have brought together eight leading
articles from both worlds in one 310-page volume.' But, their
anthology, International Rules, is more than just a convenient tool.
1 INTERNATIONAL RULES: APPROACHES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Robert J. Beck et al. eds., 1996).
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With one exception (discussed in Part III below), the excerpts in
International Rules are testament to the commonality of
fundamental issues of interest to international legal and
international relations theorists. The Editors have produced an
exciting volume that helps transcend conventional
compartmentalized thinking and sketches a tantalizing agenda for
future interdisciplinary work.
Part II of this Book Review identifies three provocative issues
of interest to both groups of theorists, and sets out how different
theoretical schools approach these issues.2 First, is international
law really "law"? Second, is there a relationship between
international law and morality, and if so, what is it? Third, does
international law "matter" in the sense of influencing state
behavior, and if so, then why are states influenced by it, i.e., why
do they endeavor to comply with it?3 Part II suggests that there are
2 See infra notes 7-233 and accompanying text.
3 By no means is this list exclusive of the issues at the intersection of international
legal and international relations theory or of the issues treated in INTERNATIONAL RULES.
For instance, a fourth issue addressed in the anthology is how international law is
formulated. Insofar as both international legal and international relations theorists seek
to promote stability and peaceful change in the world, and insofar as both groups of
theorists believe international law can be a means to this end, then the processes by
which international law comes about, and is modified, is important.
To address how international law is formulated, the Editors have chosen an
excerpt from the New Haven School. In this excerpt, Professors McDougal and
Lasswell seek to move beyond the debate about whether international law really is
"law." See Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal
of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1953), reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 113, 138. They take an interdisciplinary
approach and study the values and contexts that shape international law. See
INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 110-11. Their work is characterized by long
lists of variables to determine whether a system of world public order promotes their
proposed core value, human dignity. For instance, McDougal and Lasswell encourage
the examination of eight variables, namely (1) power (to what extent is it concentrated?);
(2) wealth (to what extent is it concentrated?); (3) respect (to what extent is minimum
respect accorded every person?); (4) well-being (to what extent are the physical health
and welfare of each person taken care of?); (5) skill (to what extent is each person given
an opportunity to increase her occupational skills through educational and other
means?); (6) enlightenment (to what extent is the gathering, transmission, and
dissemination of information protected?); (7) rectitude (to what extent is each person
free to worship?); and (8) affection (to what extent is the family unit and other
institutions of congeniality protected?). See McDougal & Lasswell, supra, at 129-36.
The reader is sure to be struck by two conflicting reactions. First, the variables
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
tremendous opportunities for cross-fertilization between
international legal and international relations theory. Additionally,
Part II guides the reader through the challenging material
encountered and also casts the material thematically to allow for a
comparative analysis of the theories on an issue-by-issue basis.
Part III evaluates International Rules critically, discussing
three shortcomings of the anthology.4 First, the piece on so-called
"New Stream" international legal scholarship requires too much
effort for too little gain. Second, there is no coverage of an
exciting school of thought in international relations theory known
as "Post-International," or "Turbulence," theory. Third, too much
attention is devoted to rules of public international law, at the cost
of an equally (or arguably more) significant branch of international
law, namely, international trade law. These shortcomings,
however, in no way detract from the overall achievement of the
Editors. They have done a marvelous job in synthesizing
illuminating pieces and stimulating creative thought. Further, their
introductory notes before each excerpt, and the first and last
chapters they authored, are helpful to both novice and seasoned
theorists!
seem like a useful conceptual framework in which to organize and compare different
systems of public order. Second, the variables are obvious and in effect amount to a
broad and abstract way of defining human rights. The conflict is exacerbated by the
New Haven School's list of variables expressly designed to compare different systems of
public order. These variables are (1) conceptions of law (e.g., perspectives on authority
and control); (2) features of power processes protected by law (e.g., how jurisdiction is
divided among sovereign states); and (3) features of basic value processes protected by
law (e.g., the degree to which wealth, enlightenment, respect, well-being, skill, rectitude,
and affection are protected). See id. 126-36. It is altogether unclear how this list relates
to the first list. Equally unclear is how the second list markedly differs from indicia of
the international rule of law. Ultimately, some readers will be energized in their
thinking by the lists, whereas others will find no value added by the lists. Whatever the
final judgment, however, all readers are likely to share in the feeling that the lists-
ironically-do not say much about how international law is formulated in a mechanical
sense, or why it is formulated in a conceptual sense.
4 See infra notes 234-93 and accompanying text.
I Legal theorists reading INTERNATIONAL RULES who are wholly unfamiliar with
international relations theory, or who seek a deeper appreciation of this theory, might
want to turn to two recent books on this theory. See JAMES E. DOUGHERTY & ROBERT L.
PFALTZGRAFF, JR., CONTENDING THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A
COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY (4th ed. 1997); INTERNATIONAL THEORY: CRITICAL
INVESTIGATIONS (James Der Derian ed., 1995). As for international relations theorists
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Finally, Part IV concludes that International Rules illustrates
the declining feasibility of a meta-theory which encompasses all
issues in international affairs.6
II. Approaches to Three Fundamental Issues
A. International Law as "Law"
Is international law really "law"? This issue has dominated the
agenda of international legal theorists. International Rules offers
selections from two jurisprudential perspectives on the issue,
Natural Law and Legal Positivism. While international relations
theorists seem to have ceded the issue to legal theorists, the
international relations theorists hardly can be disinterested in the
outcome. If lawyers do not believe international law really is
"law," then why should international relations theorists take that
law seriously? Why should they deem it worthy of consideration
as a possible influence on state behavior? Put differently, if
international law is not really "law," then the Realist schools of
international relations (discussed below) must be right in declaring
that international law and compliance therewith are
epiphenomenal.
1. Natural Law Theory
To represent Natural Law theory, the Editors select
Prolegomena, the prologue to Hugo Grotius's treatise, De Jure
Belli ac Pacis.7 This excerpt by the father of modem international
law lays out the distinction between the law of nature and the law
of nations (i.e., international law). Grotius suggested that there are
essential traits implanted in man by God, such as the desire for
wholly unfamiliar with jurisprudence, or wanting a firmer grounding in jurisprudence,
there are myriad legal theory books, though few focus on international legal theory
issues. This reviewer's favorite text in this area is M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S
INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE (6th ed. 1994).
6 See infra notes 295-96 and accompanying text.
7 HUGO GROTIUS, Prolegomena, in DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIS (1625) (The Law of
War and Peace), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 38-53. For a
discussion of this treatise and its historical and philosophical context, see MARK W.
JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-4 (1993); Louis HENKIN ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS xxi-xxv (3d ed. 1993).
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
social order.' These traits give rise to Natural Law, the rules
which govern individuals within a state.9 Grotius described
Natural Law as eternally and universally valid, i.e., it transcends
time, place, political systems, and culture.' ° Further, Natural Law
can be ascertained by human reason.' The law of nations, by
contrast, can be derived from the practice of states."
This distinction raises two problems. First, it is unclear
whether these bodies of law are different, whether they are co-
extensive, or whether one is derivative of the other. For Grotius,
the two bodies are very nearly the same, that is, both impose the
same obligations on states. For example, he declared it to be a rule
of nature to abide by pacts. 3 Contemporary international lawyers
know this rule of public international law by the name of pact sunt
servanda. It should be noted that Grotius had to take this position
to avoid undermining a basic tenet of his theory. To have admitted
that the two bodies are distinct would have been to admit that God
is not the overarching source of law. Instead, his work suggests
that few rules of the law of nations are not also Natural Law.
A second problem with the distinction drawn by Grotius is that
it is unclear whether the law of nations qualifies as "law." Grotius
did not accept the cynical view that the law of nations is not "law"
but rather expediency among states. He observed that the law of
nations derives from a need for certainty and predictability," and
further that even in times of war there are rules that states follow
to ensure the war is just.'5 Thus, for Natural Law theorists, a law is
binding even if it lacks a sanction to enforce it, because of God's
judgment, which may be manifest in this life or the afterlife.
Indeed, Grotius could not possibly have accepted the cynical view.
As he admitted, he wanted greater civility in the behavior of states
' See GROTIUS, supra note 7, at 39-40.
9 See id. at 41.
'o See INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 34.
See GROTIUS, supra note 7, at 42.
2 See id.
'' See id.
14 See id. at 44.
"5 See id. at 44-45.
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toward one another.
16
2. Legal Positivism
a. Austinian Positivism
Legal Positivists differ from Grotius and among themselves on
the resolution to the second problem. However, Legal Positivists
are linked by a common belief that the only source of law is
consent. Their inquiry is not into what the law ought to be, but
rather with what the law is. They look askance on the naturalist
notion that law can be rationally derived from a metaphysical
source, and as far as possible they want to avoid imbuing the
concept of law with morality.''
A starting point for Legal Positivism is the British jurist John
Austin (1790-1859), and his 1832 published lectures, The
Province of Jurisprudence Determined.8 Austin intones that
international "law" is nothing more than positive cross-border
morality, on par with "laws" of fashion or of honor.'9 "Law," for
Austin, is the command of a sovereign that is habitually obeyed
and enforced by a sanction.0 In simple formulaic terms, "law"
equals an order plus a sovereign plus a threat. The international
system lacks three fundamental institutions implicitly required by
this formula: a supreme legislature to enact rules, a supreme
judiciary to interpret rules, and a supreme executive to enforce
rules. These institutions can coalesce into one central authority,
but the international system lacks even this manifestation.
Therefore, in Austin's view, international rules cannot properly be
dubbed "law."'"
Perhaps Austin was influenced by the writings of early
Classical Realists, namely Thucydides's The Peloponnesian War
16 See id. at 45.
17 See INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 58.
18 See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Wilfred E.
Rumble, ed., 1995).
'9 See INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 57.
20 See id.
21 See id.
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and achivell's Te " 22and Machiavelli's The Prince. These early works suggest that
power, not law, is the basis for international order. Undoubtedly,
Austin's work has had considerable direct or indirect influence on
the celebrated writings of recent Classical Realists, including: E.H.
Carr's The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939 (1939), Hans
Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power
and Peace (1948), and Stanley Hoffmann's The Relevance of
International Law (1971). For Carr, behind all law is politics,
hence international law is nothing more than international
politics. 23 While Morgenthau is willing to concede international
law exists and is typically observed by states, he resists strongly
the notion that it is an effective restraint on the struggle among
states for power.24 Its non-existent or decentralized legislative,
adjudicatory, and enforcement mechanisms render it imprecise and
weak." States exploit it to promote their interests and evade it
when compliance would cut against their self-interest.26 Hoffman
does not find international law to be a part of political reality,
again because of the anarchical nature of the international system
and the obsession of states with their self-interest. In a most
memorable reference, Hoffman sardonically calls international law
the most powerful training ground for the imagination.28
b. Kelsen's Positivism
The Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen (1881-1973) and the British
legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart (1907-1992) are eager to rescue
international law from Austin's dustbin of morality. The excerpts
in International Rules from their writings ought to give pause to
22 See id. at 94. For a concise introduction to Realism, see JAMES N. ROSENAU &
MARY DURFEE, THINKING THEORY THOROUGHLY ch. 2 (1995). For a provocative
account of the enduring importance to Realism of Thucydides and other early theorists,
see MICHAEL W. DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE Pt. 1 (1997).
23 See INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 94-95.
24 See id. at 95-96.
25 See id. at 96.
26 See id.
27 See id. at 96-97. For a full discussion of the significance of anarchy in
international relations theory, see BRIAN C. SCHMIDT, THE POLITICAL DISCOURSE OF
ANARCHY (1998).
28 See INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 97.
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Classical Realists. Kelsen finds that Austin overplays the
importance of negative sanctions. In an excerpt selected by the
Editors from his lectures published in 1942, Law and Peace in
International Relations, Kelsen suggests that international law is
"law," at least in the primitive sense.29  Kelsen bases this
conclusion on the doctrine of bellum justum (just war), a
decentralized sanctions mechanism utilized by states acting in
concert . States regard reprisals against another state, or the use
of force by one state against another state, as illegal ("delictual,"
as Kelsen puts it), unless the reprisal or use of force is a sanction
in response to a prior illegal act (i.e., a prior "delict").3'
This doctrine, in turn, assumes states have identified certain
conduct to be illegal. Universally accepted examples of such
delicts are an unprovoked physical invasion of another state's
territory, or a failure to observe a treaty. Thus, for Kelsen a pre-
defined international rule is "law" if a sanction (1) is attached to
that rule, (2) is condoned by the international community, and (3)
may be used only in response to a violation of that rule. 32 After all,
if forcible interference in the affairs of other states is allowed
regardless of the prior occurrence of a delict, then we have not
"law" but "lawlessness." The very existence of the doctrine of
bellum justum, is enough for Kelsen to conclude international
"law" exists because the doctrine meets all three tests.
33
Unfortunately for Kelsen, his excerpt does nothing to dissuade
the skeptical reader from the view that the whole argument is a
legerdemain lacking in rigor or empirical support and filled with
circularities and redundancies. The excerpt suggests that Kelsen
infers too much about international law from just one narrow,
albeit important, doctrine. Further, it does not convince the reader
that, aside from a lack of concern about whether a sanctions
mechanism is centralized, Kelsen places less emphasis on
29 See Hans Kelsen, The Nature of International Law, in LAW AND PEACE IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES (1942) (lecture 2),
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 60, 71.
30 See id. at 64-69, 70-74.
"' See id. at 63.
32 See id. at 61-62.
3" See id. at 66, 72-74.
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sanctions than Austin.
These deficiencies are endemic to Kelsen's substance and
style, not the result of poor judgment by the Editors.34 They could
be excused, perhaps, if Kelsen were able to rebut successfully
doubts he raises about the bellum justum doctrine.35 How can war
be a sanction if its outcome is unpredictable and the winner may
be the actor that committed the initial delict?36 How can war be a
sanction if there is no central adjudicator to decide whether the
initial act indeed was a delict and, therefore, whether resort to war
is not a delict itself but a legitimate response? 37 Kelsen labels the
first question "[p]articularly serious," and the second one "[t]he
most striking objection," but does not expand on these
observations. 3' A third doubt is that the doctrine proves only that
war is morally forbidden except in response to a delict, not that a
large body of positive international law exists. Here, Kelsen's
response is abstruse, if not feeble: it should be possible to prove
states base their reciprocal behavior on a "juristic judgment" that
war is a sanction.39
31 If there is any fault to be attributed to the Editors regarding their selection from
Kelsen's work, it is that it does not cover a central idea in Kelsen's thinking, namely, the
idea that all of international law is founded upon the idea of "Grundnorn." This norm
is that states must behave as they have customarily behaved. While the Editors identify
this contribution as "Kelsen's most significant modification of earlier Positivistic
approaches," they discuss it only briefly in their note introducing Legal Positivism.
INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 58. In contrast, the Editors include in the
excerpt from H.L.A. Hart's, The Concept of Law, Hart's attack on Kelsen's view that
international law rests on this basic norm. Hart finds a norm to be a luxury that helps
ensure a set of rules is an integrated, coherent system, not a necessity to make the rules
binding. In addition, Hart finds the Grundnorm proposed by Kelsen to be a pointless
repetition of the observation that states observe certain standards of conduct as
obligatory rules. At best, the Grundnorm is simply one of these standards. See
INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 90-92. The editorial point is that a direct
Kelsen-Hart interchange about the Grundnorm would have given balance to the topic.
As it stands, the reader gets Hart's rebuttal but not Kelsen's opening salvo.
" See KELSEN, supra note 29, at 68-70 (discussing the bellumjustum doctrine).
36 See id. at 70.
17 See id.
38 Id.
39 See id. at 69.
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c. Hart's Positivism
Hart's brand of Legal Positivism, contained in his 1961
classic, The Concept of Law, is a more effective attempt at
rescuing international law from Austin's morality dustbin. For
Hart, a legal system is a union of primary rules and secondary
rules. 40 Primary rules establish obligations, the "dos" and
"don'ts. '41 Secondary rules are rules about rules, in particular, a
rule of recognition (to specify the authoritative sources of primary
rules), a rule of change (to explain how to alter primary rules), and
a rule of adjudication (to interpret and resolve disputes about
42primary rules). In the cogent excerpt selected from The Concept
of Law by the Editors, Hart admits the international legal system
lacks secondary rules and thus qualifies as "law" only in the
primitive sense.43 But, he systematically knocks out three pillars
that support Austinian skepticism about the legal status of
international rules.44
Hart finds the first pillar, that international rules are not "law"
because there is no centrally organized sanction mechanism, to be
simplistic. 45 A rule can be obligatory for reasons other than the
existence of a sanction, for example, because the addressee of the
rule feels a normative basis for compliance. Moreover, the first
pillar is based on an analogy between the international and
municipal system, but the factual contexts in these systems are
distinct. 46 Aggression among states is less common than violence
among individuals within a state.47 Some individuals are prone to
violence, hence there would be violence in a state without a
centralized sanction mechanism. 48 But, there is peace among states
40 See H.L.A. Hart, International Law, in THE CONCEPT OF LAW ch. 10 (2d ed.
1994), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 75.
41 See INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 58.
42 See id.
41 See HART, supra note 40, at 76.
4 See id. at 77-79.
45 See id. at 77-80.
46 See id. at 79.
41 See id.
48 See id.
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despite the lack of such a mechanism in the international realm, in
part because of the unpredictability of the course and outcome of
49
aggression.
Hart also finds Austin's second pillar simplistic. ° This pillar
states that a nation cannot properly be the subject of international
"law" because it is sovereign. Consequently, nations follow
international rules only if they want to do so.5 Hart finds this
pillar misconceives state sovereignty as absolute and unlimited.52
In reality, sovereignty is manifest to varying degrees in different
countries depending on their relative economic, political, military,
demographic, and cultural positions." Further, to say states cannot
be bound by international rules because of their sovereignty
wrongly inverts the inquiry and prematurely closes the dialog.
54
What should be explored initially is whether, and to what extent,
international rules afford sovereign authority to states. 55 In other
words, Hart argues, how can one know what sovereignty states
have until one knows what the international rules are? Here the
reader must forgive Hart for not so much formulating an argument
as cleverly shifting the burden of proof. Finally, as a factual
matter, it has never been questioned that new states are bound by
international rules.56  This practice ought to suggest that
international rules are more than merely self-imposed
obligations.
The third pillar of Austinian skepticism is that states in the
international arena are like individuals in primitive society. 8 Only
primary rules exist, hence these rules in the international arena are
better characterized as morality than law.59 Hart finds this pillar
49 See id. at 79-80.
50 See id. at 80-85.
51 See id. at 81-83.
52 See id.
13 See id.
14 See id.
" See id.
56 See id.
17 See id.
58 See id. at 85-88.
51 See id. at 85.
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infirm in a number of respects. First, it misuses the term
"morality" in an overly broad manner. 6° Rules of games, clubs,
and etiquette are thrown into the dustbin, along with international
rules.6' Second, states often say nothing about morality when they
make claims, or raise defenses, against other states.62 Typically,
their appeals are to technical provisions of treaties or to custom."
Third, international rules often are morally indifferent.64 That is,
they are designed to maximize certainty and predictability, and
facilitate the proof or assessment of claims, i.e., they are
formalisms and legalisms. 6' Finally, states may comply with an
international rule not out of moral obligation, but rather out of
66
rational self-interest based on a cost-benefit analysis.
3. The New Haven School
Neither Natural Law theory nor Legal Positivism has a
stranglehold on the issue of whether international law really is
"law." The New Haven School, whose most notable proponents
are Professors Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell, offer
a formula for "law" that differs from the other theories. For them,
a rule is law if it has two elements, authority and control.67
Authority is a subjective element that goes to the competency of a
decision maker: do the addressees of the rule subjectively perceive
the rule-issuing entity to be legitimate? 6 Control is an objective
element: do the addressees of the rule have an effective voice
(whether or not authorized) in decision, and does the rule actually
affect the behavior of the addressees.?6  Though they spend no
time defending their concept of law, McDougal and Lasswell are
comfortable calling international rules "law" because they find
60 See id.
61 See id.
62 See id. at 86.
63 See id.
I4 See id. at 86-87.
65 See id.
66 See id. at 87.
67 See McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 3, at 120.
68 See id.
69 See id.
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both elements in such rules.70
Do the excerpts in International Rules about Natural Law,
Legal Positivism, and the New Haven School lead the
international relations theorist to assume safely that international
law really is "law"? To be sure, the international legal system may
not be as well developed as municipal law systems-though the
gap may be narrowing, as intimated by the discussion of
international trade law in Part III below. But, there exists a
sufficient body of jurisprudence to indicate that lawyers take
international law seriously, so international relations specialists
ought to do the same.
B. International Law and Morality
Is there a relationship between international law and morality,
and if so, what is it? International legal and international relations
theorists care about the answer because it tells them whether
appeals to international law as a possible constraint on state
behavior are morally meaningful. Presumably, an international
legal rule imbued with morality is more forceful-it packs a "just
punch"-than a morally empty one. This is particularly true if
there is no centralized enforcement mechanism. Alternatively, it
might be supposed that talking about morality in the international
political context is quixotic, even dangerous, if it leads to under-
estimating security threats.
1. Natural Law Theory
Legal Positivists obviously respond to the issue by asserting
there is no necessary connection between law and morality. For
centuries, this response has influenced many legal approaches to
justice in the international arena. Indeed, in his 1995 book, The
Restructuring of International Relations Theory, Mark Neufeld
argues that theory oriented toward human emancipation is
underdeveloped because of the predominance of Positivism which
lacks any emancipatory content.7'
Positivism has not been the only response to the issue. To
70 See id. at 121-22.
71 See MARK NEUFELD, THE RESTRUCTURING OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THEORY 1-4 (1995).
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Natural Law theorists like Grotius, and before him Cicero (106-43
B.C.), Saint Thomas Aquinas (1224-74), and the Spanish Jesuit
scholars such as Father Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546), the
answer is that international law and morality are connected." In
their view, the key feature of an international rule that makes it
obligatory is the embodiment of a Natural Law principle. Through
such an embodiment, states are bound in their external relations by
divine principles knowable to humans through revelation or
reason. Moreover, God's punishment against unjust actors is an
ample gap-filling sanction in an international environment lacking
a centralized human enforcement mechanism. 73 Thus, as Grotius
assiduously points out, at least since the Roman Era, states have
recognized that war must be prosecuted in a manner free from
reproach in order to be just.74
2. The New Haven School
Of course, analysis of international law from a normative
perspective did not die with Grotius. The Natural Law legacy is
evident in New Haven School thinking.75 This School emphasizes
the processes by which, and the institutions through which,
international law is created. 76  But, its proponents, Professors
McDougall and Lasswell, do not hide the normative dimension of
their project. They seek knowledge about processes and
institutions in order to advance the cause of human dignity, which
they propose as the core value of the international system.77 By
"human dignity" they mean "a social process in which values are
widely and not narrowly shared, and in which private choice,
72 See INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 34-36.
73 See GROTIUS, supra note 7, at 43.
74 See id. at 44-45.
75 The influence of Natural Law theory is also evident in many other important
works. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
(1995) (developing a theory of fairness and arguing that international law has the ability
to advance abstract social values); CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979) (developing a normative theory of international
political economy based on the justice of a state's domestic institutions and the principle
of international distributive justice to achieve a fair division of wealth across the globe).
76 See INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 110-11.
17 See id. at 111.
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rather than coercion, is emphasized as the predominant modality
of power.""8 They want to engage in a "continuous reappraisal of
the circumstances in which specific institutional combinations can
make the greatest net contribution to the overarching goal" of
human dignity.7 9 Their candor reminds us of Grotius's statement
that the law of nations has "in view the advantage, not of particular
states, but of the great society of states."80 States, in other words,
ought to emphasize not their relative power positions, but their
shared interest in promoting the dignity of each individual.
3. Feminist Legal Theory
Likewise, feminist legal scholars have been influenced by
Natural Law thinking. In a fascinating excerpt in International
Rules, Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley Wright
rightly observe that the power structure in municipal legal systems
is dominated by men.8" This male-dominated structure is
replicated at the international level.82 Most positions in
international organizations, and certainly virtually all of the senior-
most offices, are held by men. 3 They point out embarrassing, if
not grotesque, facts: (1) at present trends, it will take until 2021
for half of the professional posts in the United Nations to be held
by women; (2) only one woman has been a judge on the
International Court of Justice; and (3) no woman has served on the
International Law Commission.84 The gender asymmetry means
that international law addresses issues of interest to men.85 Men
mis-conceptualize international law as necessarily resting on the
public-private distinction. 6 They regard the proper province of
78 McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 3, at 122.
79 Id. at 116 (emphasis in original); cf. id. at 122, 138-39.
80 GROTIUS, supra note 7, at 42.
81 See INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 254.
82 See Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85
AM. J. INT'L L. 613 (1991), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 256,
263.
83 See id.
84 See id. at 263-64.
85 See id. at 264-69.
86 See id. at 265.
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international law as the public realm." The private realm-the
world of home and hearth-is off limits to international law.8
This situation has disastrous consequences for women because
they are frequently victims in the private realm. In particular, they
suffer from pervasive and severe physical and emotional domestic
abuse. Such abuse is not governed by international human rights
law. For example, "torture," as defined in the United Nations
Convention Against Torture is confined to acts inflicted by public
officials (or those acting in an official capacity) to punish,
intimidate, coerce, or discriminate. 89 As far as international human
rights law is concerned, the feminist legal theorists correctly note
that men are free to beat their wives at home.9° There are few
international legal instruments which address women's issues, and
the ones that do are riddled with exceptions and reservations. For
instance, over 40 of the 105 parties to the International Labor
Organization's Women's Convention-the most prominent such
instrument-have taken a total of about 100 reservations. 9' In
sum, the feminist legal scholars poignantly illustrate that
apparently neutral systems of rules can be, and are, gender biased.
The resulting impact of this bias on women is cruel and sometimes
deadly.
Like the New Haven School, feminist legal scholars also care
about the normative content of international law. Neither group of
theorists could possibly accept the Positivist conception of a
divorce between law and morality. The feminists, in particular,
argue persuasively for international law to accord higher priority
to economic, social, and cultural rights (as well as traditional,
political and civil rights) so as to emancipate women.92 Equally
persuasive is their argument that the law ought to consider the
effects on women of extant international rights accepted by men,
namely, the right to development (e.g., how are women affected by
economic development?) and to self-determination (e.g., how are
87 See id. at 265-66.
88 See id.
89 See id. at 267.
9 See id. at 268.
9' See id. at 271.
92 See id. at 272-76.
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women treated by men in freedom-fighter movements?). 93 These
arguments harken back to Natural Law theory.
If there is one missing piece about which the reader of
International Rules is likely to wonder, it surely is the influence of
religion on the normative content of international law as it relates
to human rights. To what extent do religious beliefs-and here
Islam is in for special scrutiny-retard the progressive
development of the law in the feminist direction? The feminist
authors touch on Islam94 but they seem a bit unwilling to tackle it
head on, perhaps for fear of appearing prejudiced. Instead, what is
needed is an objective appraisal of world religions and their effect
on the international legal rights of women.
4. Classical Realism
In stark contrast to Natural Law theory and the contemporary
schools it has influenced stand the Classical Realists. They
vehemently oppose conceptualizing a link between international
law and morality, particularly when such a link might have policy
ramifications. George Kennan, in an excerpt from his famous
1951 book, American Diplomacy, argues forcefully that any
attempt at linking international law and morality is pure hearted,
but empty headed sentimentality with potentially horrendous
consequences. 9 Kennan, the "intellectual architect ' 96 of America's
Cold War policy of containing communism, ferociously attacks
what he calls the "legalistic-moralistic" approach to international
relations. 97 Legalistic moralists believe it is possible to suppress
chaos and danger through international law.98  The hidden
assumption underlying their optimism is that Anglo-Saxon legal
93 See id. at 276-80.
9' See id. at 273-74.
95 See GEORGE F. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 91-103 (expanded ed. 1984)
(1951). For an iconoclastic history of American diplomacy from the 1890s to the 1970s,
see WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY (1959).
96 INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 96.
97 See GEORGE F. KENNAN, Diplomacy in the Modern World, in AMERICAN
DIPLOMACY ch. 6 (expanded ed. 1984) (1951), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL RULES,
supra note 1, at 99, 101.
98 See id. at 101-02.
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concepts applicable to individuals in a municipal system are
applicable to states in the international system.99 Not surprisingly,
followers of this approach prefer to resolve disputes by reference
to a set of agreed-upon rules interpreted by competent judicial
entities.' °° Their preference assumes that all peoples agree (or can
be persuaded through reason) that their aspirations ultimately are
less important than international order and stability.' 1 Kennan
charges that legalistic moralists commit seven blunders in taking
this view.
First, they wrongly assume that all states are reasonably
content with their status (e.g., their borders) and that states will
suppress their desire for change to preserve international order and
stability.'°2 In Kennan's view, this assumption grossly
underestimates the number of maladjustments and discontents
around the world and the tremendous sacrifices they will make to
realize their aims.'0 3  In an era of suicidal terrorist threats,
Kennan's point is well taken.
Second, legalistic moralists empower states, and bolster their
sovereignty, by ignoring physical, political, and economic
distinctions among states and by supporting the one state-one vote
principle in international organizations.' 04 Sovereign states are not,
however, the exclusive (or even predominant) players in the
international arena, and they are not all equal in political,
economic, military, or cultural power. Ignoring non-state actors,
and differences among states, is naive.
Third, legalistic moralists are blind to the constant flux in the
pattern and power of states.0 5  They fail to appreciate how
99 See id.
"00 See id. at 102.
'0' See id.
102 See id. at 103.
103 See id.
'i See id.
105 See id. For an argument that the concept of power ought to be disaggregated
into (1) relational power (i.e., the Classical Realist concept of one state compelling
another to do something it would not otherwise do) and (2) structural power (i.e., the
ability to shape and determine the structure of the international political economy in
which other states and multinational corporations must operate), see SUSAN STRANGE,
STATES AND MARKETS 24-42 (2d ed. 1988).
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dynamic, even unstable, states are.'0 6  As a result, instead of
seeking ways to facilitate peaceful change, legalistic moralists
impose international law on states like a "strait jacket" in order to
preserve the status quo.'0 7  Indeed, proponents of legalistic
moralism overlook the importance of practicality and flexibility in
the law itself.'0 8
Fourth, the legalistic moralists' view of international law over-
emphasizes military power to the exclusion of non-military means
of projecting power.' °9 For example, a state may project its power
through a puppet government in another state, but at the same time
preserve the "outward attributes" of that government's
sovereignty." As a result, legalistic moralists may not save the
very people they hope to help."' For example, the United
Nations-championed by the legalistic moralists-did nothing for
the people of eastern Europe under domination by the former
Soviet Union."' Because the former Soviet Union generally
avoided using military force in eastern Europe, with the notable
exceptions of Hungary in 1956 and the former Czechoslovakia in
1968, legalistic moralists and the U.N. were less concerned than
they ought to have been about eastern European independence." 3
Fifth, legalistic moralists wrongly assume a domestic issue
will not become an international problem, i.e., that domestic
disputes are not a source of international instability. 114 They
envision a world of states that are either internally tranquil or beset
with problems confined to their borders and of no relevance
beyond."5 In fact, the world community often is forced to choose
among rival claimants to power within a particular state. Bosnia,
Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Lebanon, and Cyprus are recent
101 See KENNAN, supra note 97, at 103.
107 Id.
'08 See id.
'0o See id. at 103-04.
"o Id. at 104.
"' See id.
112 See id.
' See id.
114 See id.
"' See id.
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cases of domestic problems spilling onto the world stage and
compelling the world community to sort out the disputes.
Sixth, legalistic moralists grossly overestimate the efficacy of
collective sanctions. '1 6 The more inclusive a military coalition, the
lower the least common political denominator on which all
coalition members agree. "7 To broaden membership, the scope
and depth of the substantive basis for membership must be
sacrificed." 8 Worse still, there is a law of diminishing returns
applicable to coalition building." 9 As yet another state is added to
the team, the marginal contribution of that state to the team
diminishes vis-A-vis the marginal contribution of the previous
addition."0
Kennan saves his most powerful criticism of legalistic
moralism for last.'2' By linking law and morality, the legalistic
moralists carry over concepts of right and wrong to the affairs of
state, presuming that state behavior is susceptible to moral
judgment.122 Lawbreakers, by virtue of their moral inferiority, are
targets of not only moral indignation but sometimes physical
punishment, i.e., war.'23 Yet, when legal moralists endorse war to
punish the transgressor, they know no bounds.'2 4 Blinded by high
moral principles, they demand the complete submission of, and
unconditional surrender by, the transgressor, and are willing to
wage total war to achieve their end.' 25 This result is both ironic
and dangerous. Legalistic moralism seeks to eliminate war, yet it
"makes violence more enduring, more terrible, and more
destructive to political stability than did the older motives of
national interest."'
2 6
116 See id.
''7 See id.
118 See id.
119 See id.
120 See id.
121 See id. at 105.
122 See id.
123 See id.
124 See id.
125 See id.
126 Id.
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The pragmatic reader of International Rules will be tempted to
accept Kennan's arguments in light of Natural Law theory and its
continuing influence in some quarters, most likely because they
seem more in tune with how the world works. She may be
inclined to reinforce the arguments with examples of her own. For
instance, perhaps the savagery of the Iran-Iraq War illustrates
Kennan's seventh argument. The two-page excerpt from Dean
Acheson, which points out that much of international law is really
"a body of ethical distillation," '27 reinforces the temptation.
Acheson is willing to admit only a procedural benefit from
international law, namely, it calls for delays before taking drastic
action, and that such cooling off periods allow for the views of
adversaries to be considered.'28 Possibly, the temptation would be
easier to resist had the Editors included in International Rules an
excerpt from a defender of legal moralism. An excerpt on
Wilsonian idealism, for example, would allow a legalistic moralist
to speak directly and forcefully to the reader, rather than through a
critic.29
C. The Effect of International Law on State Behavior
Does international law "matter" in the sense of influencing
state behavior? If so, then why? For example, do states comply
with international law, and if they do, what is motivating them to
comply? International legal and international relations theorists
obviously need to know which potential constraints on state
behavior are effective if these theorists are to propose ways of
fostering stability and peaceful change. If international law is
irrelevant in mitigating disputes and managing crises, the theorists
should pursue the use of other possible tools.
127 Dean Acheson, Remarks, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 57TH ANNUAL MEETING 13 (1963), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL
RULES, supra note 1, at 107.
128 See id. at 107-08.
129 See, e.g., AUGUST HECKSCHER, WOODROW WILSON chs. 7-11 (1991). For a
critical discussion of Wilsonian idealism, see RONALD STEEL, TEMPTATIONS OF A
SUPERPOWER 82-101 (1995).
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1. Classical Realism
Both schools of Realist thought, Classical Realism and Neo-
Realism (also known as Structural Realism) find international law
to be largely irrelevant. States have no strong motivations to
comply with international law in any meaningful sense, namely,
when it is contrary to their interests. Classical Realism begins-
and to some extent ends-with the premise that the international
relations system is anarchical, i.e., that there is no central
authority.13 ° No doubt this premise will remind the reader of
Austinian Positivism and will provoke her to evaluate the
importance that Classical Realists put on this point. Given an
anarchical system, Classical Realists like Carr, Morgenthau, and
Kennan ask rhetorically how international relations can be
anything but power politics.' There is little systematic theorizing
here: states battle to maximize their absolute power positions.
International regimes like international law are insignificant-
epiphenomal-in this battle.
2. Neo-Realism
Like Classical Realists, Neo-Realists such as Kenneth N.
Waltz and Joseph M. Grieco view sovereign states as the primary
actors on the world stage. 3 2 Also like Classical Realists, Neo-
Realists accept the premise of an anarchical world.'33 However,
Neo-Realism is to be distinguished from its cousin in at least three
respects. 34 First, Neo-Realism is "more theoretically ambitious"
than Classical Realism.'35 For Neo-Realists, more can be said
about international relations than that they are just power politics:
it ought to be possible to develop theoretical insights into these
130 See INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 96.
131 See id. at 95-96.
132 See Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist
Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT'L ORG. 485 (1988), reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 147, 149; ROSENAU & DURFEE, supra note 22, at
13-14. For an incisive and highly readable Neo-Realist analysis of international
relations, see ROBERT GILPIN, WAR & CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS (1981).
133 See ROSENAU & DURFEE, supra note 22, at 14.
134 See INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 144-45.
"' Id. at 144.
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relations.'36 Second, Neo-Realists argue "survival and security are
the ends of states, and power [is one of several] means to [achieve]
those ends."'137  In contrast, Classical Realists view power
maximization as the goal of states.3 ' Third, Neo-Realists look for
innate characteristics of the international relations system that
cause conflict.'39  Classical Realists are satisfied with the
observation that all conflict is rooted in the lust of states for
140power.
Interestingly, in spite of these differences, Neo-Realists reach
the same conclusion as Classical Realists about the unimportance
of international law in affecting state behavior. Indeed, Neo-
Realists declare resolutely that international law is an
epiphenomenon."4' Their declaration follows logically from the
essential elements of Neo-Realism. 14'2 First, states are unitary, i.e.,
each state speaks with one voice. ' Second, states are rational, i.e.,
they carefully weigh the costs and benefits of possible actions,
assess and order their preferences, and are consistent in choosing
among preferences.'" Third, states are motivated by the will to
survive, that is, by their security, not just by power maximization,
as the Classical Realists contend. 45  The second and third
elements, taken together, mean every state's preferences are
ordered as follows: security, economic well-being, and lastly
human rights. 146 Security is pre-eminent because without it a state
has no sovereignty, and its very existence is in doubt. 1'4 Fourth,
war and diplomacy are the primary means by which states express
their power-oriented preferences and realize their power-based
136 See id.
137 Id.
136 See id.
'39 See id. at 145.
140 See id.
141 See id. at 146.
142 See Grieco, supra note 132, at 149.
143 See ROSENAU & DURFEE, supra note 22, at 12.
144 See id. at 12-13.
14" See id. at 13, 16-19, 24-26.
146 See id. at 13.
147 See id. at 14.
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goals.' 48 Given the existence of anarchy, ultimately each state can
rely only on itself since international organizations or collective
state action are unreliable means to express preferences or realize
goals.149 The second, third, and fourth elements explain why Neo-
Realists pay little attention to the internal structure, history, or
culture of a state: they are irrelevant because every state behaves
the same way when faced with the same external stimuli. 5°
Finally, and most importantly, Neo-Realists assert that states are
positional, meaning they focus on power gains relative to other
states as opposed to absolute power gains, as the Classical Realists
assume."' Differences among states in population size, territory,
resource endowment, economic strength, military strength,
political stability, and diplomatic competence determine relative152
power. As positional actors, states face a perpetual security
dilemma: an effort by one state to increase its security threatens
the position of other states.53
These elements, coupled with the premise of anarchy, lead
Neo-Realists to scoff at the relevance of international law to state
behavior. Indeed, as further discussed below, for Neo-Realists the
prospects for cooperation among states are poor. A state may
withdraw from agreements, or decline even to enter into
negotiations, if it perceives that other states will gain relatively
more from cooperation than itself. 54 In brief, Neo-Realism holds
that international relations involve "'the same damn things over
and over again: war, great power security and economic
competitions, the rise and fall of great powers, and the formation
and dissolution of alliances."" 55
148 See id. at 12-13.
149 See id. at 14.
"So See id. at 12.
' See id. at 11-12, 16-19, 24-26.
152 See id. at 16-19.
"' See id. at 15.
154 See Grieco, supra note 132, at 147.
155 ROSENAU & DURFEE, supra note 22, at 29 (quoting Christopher Layne, Kant or
Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace, INT'L SEC., Fall 1994, at 5, 10).
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3. Rational Institutionalism
Institutionalism-of which there are two primary schools,
Rational Institutionalism and Sociological (or Reflective)
Institutionalism 16-is much more optimistic than Neo-Realism
about the effect of international law on state behavior. Whereas
Neo-Realists argue that international law is a secondary or
derivative phenomenon unlikely to influence states in their relative
power struggles, Rational Institutionalists such as Robert 0.
Keohane consider it to be an independent causal factor that can
prescribe and constrain state behavior.'57  The Rational
Institutionalist position reflects the different nature of the
enterprise: Neo-Realists seek to explain and predict state behavior
while Rational Institutionalists want to prescribe pathways for
increased cooperation among states.'58 Rational Institutionalism
also reflects a rejection of some of the essential elements of
Realism. "'
Rational Institutionalists accept the Realist premise of an
anarchic arena, yet they believe that the prospects for cooperation
among states, particularly under the auspices of international
organizations, are not so poor as the Realists believe.' 6° First,
states are not as concerned about power and security as the
Realists suggest. 6' After all, weapons of mass destruction render
war prohibitively costly, and economic interdependence among
states is increasing.'62 States view each other as potential partners
that can help bolster economic growth and development.
63
Second, "states are [not] unitary or rational actors."'' 1  For
example, authority is decentralized in some states, so there may
156 See INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note I, at 4.
'57 See id. at 145-46.
58 See id. at 145.
'19 See Grieco, supra note 132, at 149.
160 See id. at 147; INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 166.
161 See Grieco, supra note 132, at 149.
162 See id.
163 See id.
164 Id.
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not exist one clear, calculating voice. 165 Third, states are not the
only central actors on the world stage. 166  International
organizations, multinational corporations (MNCs), labor unions,
and political parties represent other leading actors.
6 1
Rational Institutionalists not only reject the Realist position
that states avoid cooperation but they also explain what motivatesS 168
states to cooperate. In other words, Rational Institutionalists
offer a theory as to why states may be willing to comply with
international law. Accepting the Realist premise of an anarchical
world, Rational Institutionalists use game theory to conceptualize
every state's decision whether to comply with international law.6 9
To them, states face a Prisoner's Dilemma: "each state prefers
mutual cooperation to mutual non-cooperation," but also prefers
cheating to mutual cooperation and "mutual defection to
victimization by another state's cheating."'7 Without a centralized
sanction mechanism to bind states to their promises, the Prisoner's
Dilemma model predicts that "each [state] defects regardless of
what it expects the other [state] to do."''
Rational Institutionalists emphasize that this prediction need
not materialize because of countervailing forces which lead tomu u l .. 172
mutual cooperation. First, states may learn that a tit-for-tat
reciprocity strategy-when the Prisoner's Dilemma game is
played repeatedly and mutual defection occurs and each state
thereby victimizes the other---does not benefit them. 17  A state
may offer to cooperate on a conditional basis, i.e., as long as the
other state cooperates.' In turn, repeated positive experiences
with conditional cooperation will reinforce cooperative behavior. '71
165 See id.
166 See id.
167 See id.
168 See id. at 147-49, 151.
169 See id. at 151.
170 Id.
171 Id.
171 See id.
173 See id.
174 See id.
175 See id.
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Second, states may realize that cooperative behavior can be
inexpensive.'76 If international organizations help in the verifying
process, the cost of verifying the behavior of another state may be
low relative to the benefits of cooperation and to the costs
associated with defection and victimization.177 The United Nations
(UN) weapons inspection process is a good example. In other
words, cooperation may be economically rational in a cost-benefit
sense.
Because they begin with the Realist premise of anarchy and
use the Prisoner's Dilemma model, Rational Institutionalists can
legitimately claim that they intentionally set out to prove a
difficult case. In truth, the world might not be as anarchical as the
Realists maintain. In the political realm, the UN ought to count
for something; in the economic realm, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO)
are not trivialities. Moreover, there are well-known, common
sense reasons to doubt game theory. How are the payoff values
formulated? The theory's predictions depend on the initial payoff
values established. What happens when states are involved in an
infinite number of plays? States are, after all, repeat players.
Against a background of Realism, therefore, Rational
Institutionalists attempt to make a credible case that international
law matters and explain why states have an incentive to comply
with it.
Neo-Realists, at least, remain unpersuaded.' s First, they find
an erroneous hidden assumption in the argument: a state's only
goal remains to maximize their absolute power, or in the lingo of
the Prisoner's Dilemma model, to maximize their individual total
long-term payoffs. 79 In fact, states may not always define
themselves in such individualistic terms."0 Indeed, they may work
together on certain problems.'"' More importantly, survival and
176 See id.
177 See id.
178 See id. at 153-60.
179 See id. at 153-54.
180 See id. at 155.
'8' See id. Grieco notes, for example, that states look at a relationship with another
state as a means to prevent that other state from making relative gains. See id.
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security, not absolute power maximization, are the central aims of
every state.'82 Therefore, according to the Neo-Realists, states
worry about much more than cheating by other states: as
positional actors, their concern lies in gains and losses relative to
other states.' 3 Second, Neo-Realists point out that concerns about
relative positions significantly constrain the willingness of states
to cooperate.'84 Rational Institutionalists forget that anarchy means
more than a lack of central authority to enforce international law.'
It also means that no central authority provides protection from
threats to survival and security, i.e., from cheaters.'
86
Consequently, states may seek to maintain a balance of power,
particularly if that balance suits their survival and security
interests.'8 7 States may sustain this balance through war or forcible
intervention, military alliances or coalitions, or diplomatic
strategies (e.g., moderation, vigilance, or the payment of
compensation). 8 8 Where cooperation occurs, Neo-Realists would
likely argue that hegemonic power compelled it; thus, cooperation
endures only as long as the other states perceive hegemon as a
legitimate leader.8 9
The above discussion clarifies that Rational Institutionalists
admire and use economic tools of analysis, including game theory.
Interestingly, in this regard two different Institutionalist camps,
Modern Sociological Institutionalists and Post-Modern
Sociological Institutionalists, oppose them.' 90 All three camps
agree that international law matters and affects state behavior.
However, Sociological Institutionalists highlight what the
Rationalist camp leaves out when considering the evolution of
regimes and their importance: culture, norms, values, history, and
182 See supra notes 146-147 and accompanying text.
181 See Grieco, supra note 132, at 155.
184 See ROSENAU & DURFEE, supra note 22, at 24-25.
185 See Grieco, supra note 132, at 155.
186 See id.
187 See id.
188 See ROSENAU & DURFEE, supra note 22, at 22-24.
89 See id. at 26.
190 See INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 166.
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discourse.'9 ' Further, whereas Modem Sociological
Institutionalists, like Rational Institutionalists, accept the realist
premise of an anarchical intemational arena, Post-modem
Sociological Institutionalists tend to reject this premise.192
4. Regime Theory
Undeterred by the Realist counter-attack, both Rational and
Sociological Institutionalists focus much more on "regimes," and
less on states, than do Realists. A "regime" is a set of "principles,
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor
expectations converge in a given issue-area."' 9 Thus, for example,
a body of intemational law, including the attendant institutional
apparatus, could qualify as a "regime." As for the four elements of
a "regime," (1) "principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and
rectitude"; (2) "norms are standards of behavior [manifest] . . . in
rights and obligations"; (3) "rules are specific prescriptions or
proscriptions for action"; and (4) "procedures are practices for
making and implementing [decisions]."' 94 Principles and norms
are the defining features of a regime. 95 If they change, then the
regime changes.' 96 In contrast, a change in rules or procedures is a
change within the regime.' 9' If any of the four elements of a
regime becomes less coherent, or if actual state behavior becomes
inconsistent with the regime, then the regime is weakened.'98
Conceptually, a regime is an intervening variable.' 99 It stands
between, on the one hand, basic causal variables (e.g., egoistic
9' See id.
192 See id.
"I Stephen Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, 36 INT'L ORG. 185 (1982), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL RULES,
supra note 1, at 167. For full treatments of Regime Theory, see REGIME THEORY AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Volker Rittberger ed., 1993); INTERNATIONAL REGIMES
(Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983).
'94 Krasner, supra note 193, at 168.
'9' See id. at 169.
196 See id.
1' See id.
198 See id. at 170.
19 See id. at 171.
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self-interest, power, norms and principles, usages and custom, and
knowledge) that clearly influence state behavior and, on the other
hand, actual behavioral outcomes. °° Indeed, these basic causal
variables can lead to the creation of, and cause change in, a
regime.2°' It follows a regime is not a mere agreement among
states, because an agreement is a one-shot, temporary
202transaction. A regime is designed to promote agreements andf cltt.. 203on men stt acin ar
facilitate cooperation. "Cooperation" means state actions are
brought into conformity with one another through policy
• • 204
coordination. It is distinct from "harmony," where one state's
policies automatically facilitate the goals of another state, and
from "discord," where one state's policies hinder the realization of
another state's goals.2 5
The debate between Rational Institutionalists/Regime
Theorists and Realists is about the relative importance of basic
causal factors versus regimes in affecting state behavior.
Naturally, Realists argue that Regime Theorists over-emphasize
the common interests and sense of community among states.
Rational prudence alone will not necessarily compel states to
cooperate. °6 States may need to be compelled into cooperation
through a hegemonic power.2°' Further, targeting Sociological
Institutionalists such as Andrew Hurrell who advocate Regime
Theory, Realists point out that the normative dimension of
international law, manifest in human rights law or international
environmental law, operates on the minds and emotions of
individuals within states. This force can undermine or destabilize
regimes. To the extent a Regime Theorist pursues normative ends,
she risks sacrificing order. 08
200 See id.
201 See id. at 175-83.
202 See id. at 171.
203 See id. at 168.
204 See Robert 0. Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT'L
STUD. Q. 379 (1988), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 187, 188.
205 See id.
206 See id.
207 See id.
208 See Andrew Hurrell, International Society and the Study of Regimes: A
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Regime Theorists counter that state behavior is susceptible to
governance by a regime.2 They admit basic causal variables can
and do assert a direct impact on state behavior.2'0 But, they insist
these variables also operate on state behavior indirectly, through
regimes, and that regimes themselves exert their own independent
influence. 21 1 Regime Theorists are unwilling to yield to the Realist
position that conceptualizing regimes as standing between basic
causal variables and behavioral outcomes obscures the importance
of basic causal variables.
Regime Theorists' confidence in a regime's ability to exert an
impact on state behavior is based on analysis of projected
interactions among states. As suggested in the above discussion of
Institutionalism," 2  Regime Theorists offer by analogy the
Prisoner's Dilemma as just one instance where a regime can affect
state behavior.23 There are, however, more examples. "Chicken,"
where two states are headed on a collision course and neither is
inclined to change course, is another situation.2 4 In this situation,
a regime may help avoid a disastrous outcome.1 5 Still another
instance where a regime can make a difference is where it is
difficult to coordinate the logistics of cooperation because of high
transaction or enforcement costs." 6 A regime might lower those
costs, for example, by providing a forum for negotiations or an
infrastructure for enforcement. '17 Here again, the UN weapons
inspection system illustrates the point. Yet another example is
where states have an incorrect or incomplete information set, are
uncertain about the array of choices they face and the risks and
probabilities associated with each choice, or have unrealistic
Reflective Approach, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note
193, at 49, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 206, 215-16.
209 See Krasner, supra note 193, at 171-73.
210 See id. at 171.
211 See id.
212 See supra notes 168-91 and accompanying text.
213 See Krasner, supra note 193, at 172.
214 See id.
215 See id.
216 See id.
217 See id.
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expectations. A regime can facilitate cooperation by providing
knowledge, reducing uncertainty, and stabilizing expectations."'
A final example might be the provision of public goods. Where no
single state may be willing to internalize the costs of providing
such goods, a regime of several states may agree to act jointly and
thereby share the cost.219
In general, then, for Regime Theorists, "regimes can have an
impact when Pareto-optimal outcomes could not be achieved
through uncoordinated individual calculations of self-interest. 20
In an increasingly globalized environment, the number of
problems demanding coordinated action is growing. For instance,
military conflicts and pollution can spill over borders, and foreign
exchange crises and stock market gyrations can spread from one
country to the next. Thus, regimes matter because they provide a
critical functional benefit: they allow states to coordinate their
behavior to achieve a desired solution to a particular problem.22'
Sociological Institutionalists add a few more points in defense
of Regime Theory against the Realist assault. First, a regime can
222provide a state with legitimacy. By virtue of its membership in a
regime, for example the observance of international law, a state is
"somebody" in the world arena. Second, this membership also can
provide validation in a normative sense, i.e., a state may believe in
the obligatory nature of a regime because the regime is founded on
Natural Law principles.223 Third, Realists overemphasize the
importance of state positionality. States may have a common
cultural tradition that facilitates communication, conveys a sense
of moral obligation, and imparts a common value system.224
Fourth, while Regime Theory implicitly assumes cooperation
among states has an intrinsic value, it does not presume that every
218 See Keohane, supra note 204, at 195.
219 See id. at 176-77.
220 Krasner, supra note 193, at 172. A Pareto-optimal outcome is one in which at
least one party is made better off, and no other party is made worse off. See THE MIT
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 323 (4th ed. 1992).
221 See Keohane, supra note 204, at 195-99; Hurrell, supra note 208, at 211-12.
222 See Hurrell, supra note 208, at 213-14.
223 See id. at 215-16.
224 See id. at 216-17.
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regime ipso facto is good or benign. There is a distinction
between the order provided by a regime and the just nature of the
regime. Thus, it may be quite appropriate that the normative
dimension of international law undermines or destabilizes a
regime.225
Interestingly, scholars influenced by the Natural Law tradition
226expand Regime Theory one further step. These scholars argue
that every state feels constrained by principles, norms, or rules,
and they observe a diminution in the sovereignty of states due to
cross-border networks of elites and cross-border movements of
persons.227 Thus, whereas Realists view regimes as unnecessary
clutter between basic causal variables and state behavior, and
Regime Theorists view regimes as intervening variables that can
independently or by incorporation of basic causal variables affect
state behavior, scholars in the Natural Law tradition see regimes as
pervasive in every facet of international affairs. 22 According to
Natural Law Theorists, regimes influence, and are influenced by,
state behavior. 29 Moreover, regimes and outcomes are infused
with normative significance.230  For instance, a market, one
example of a regime, is not sustained merely by calculated self-
interest, but also by a broad social understanding about the virtues
of efficiency and transactional freedom.231
As is clear from the above discussion, Regime Theory
generally has been the province of international relations theorists.
Where do the international legal theorists stand on this debate? To
answer this question, it is useful to remember the fundamental
issue at stake: whether, and how, competing sovereign states in an
anarchical world can cooperate. The international legal theorist's
perspective on the debate may well depend on her specialty. For
example, Regime Theory makes eminent sense to an international
225 See id. at 219-20.
226 See Krasner, supra note 193, at 173-74.
227 See id.
228 See id. at 174-75.
229 See id. at 175.
230 See id. at 173-74.
231 See id. at 174.
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232trade lawyer, a point discussed in Part III below. However, to a
national security specialist, who is certainly used to operating in a
world of zero-sum games, the concept of a regime indeed may be
clutter. There is, however, one Realist criticism of the Regime
Theory upon which lawyers will agree, regardless of their
specialty. Regime Theory does not explain the impact of domestic
politics on state behavior, nor on the inclination of states to
cooperate with one another.233 It must be noted, however, that
Realism is wanting in this respect as well, since Realists view
states as unitary-rational actors.
III. Suggestions for Improvement
As explained in Part II, International Rules is a great work of
interdisciplinary scholarship which provides an excellent
discussion of the various approaches to critical issues facing
international legal and international relations theorists. There are,
however, three areas for improvement. First, the Editors should
reconsider the unwieldy excerpt on New Stream Theory. Second,
an excerpt on Turbulence theory would provide a modern
perspective to global trends. Finally, the Editors should consider
emphasizing practical applications of the theories discussed to
give the theories additional vitality and meaning to practitioners
and academics alike.
A. Rethink the New Stream Selection
The Editors of International Rules included an excerpt on
"New Stream" theory which is an utter waste of space in the
book.234 It is precisely the kind of incomprehensible gibberish that
gives legal academics a bad name among practicing lawyers and
marginalizes them even within the legal academy. Consider this
nebulous passage: "A sources discourse which operated
completely within the rhetoric of either consent or systemic
considerations would seem doctrinal, but it would not be able to
232 See infra notes 234-94 and accompanying text.
233 See Hurrell, supra note 208, at 220-22.
234 See David Kennedy, A New Stream of International Law Scholarship, 7 Wis.
INT'L. L.J. 1-12, 28-39 (1988) (lectures I & III), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL RULES,
supra note 1, at 230-52.
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avoid a more substantive face., 235  The sentence would be
excusable if it were an isolated incident. Unfortunately, however,
the excerpt is replete with sentences in which the words as strung
together are infathomable. A few pages later, for instance, the
reader is edified by the following passage: "Jurisdiction doctrine,
seeking independence from substance, asserts its objectivity and
elides reliance upon substantive notions of territory and
statehood., 236  Many readers will be left with the indelible
impression that jargon triumphs in New Stream theory, and worse
yet, that the jargon is a veil covering a thin layer of substantive
knowledge regarding international law, particularly real world
specialties like international trade law.
Furthermore, the New Stream excerpt is the printed version of
237two lectures. Clarity and cogency are two of the attributes of a
good lecture. A published version means that the lecturer/author
has had two chances to achieve this. Thus, no reader should
tolerate an incoherent, impotent published lecture. There are many
examples from the international relations literature in which the
lecturer/author did present a cogent and clear lecture. Ronald
Steel's 1995 book Temptations of a Superpower, based on a
presentation, uses an easy-going yet forceful sty. 238 Spreenttio, sy oi  rc ulstyle. teel argues
that America's Cold War victory is inchoate because it has not yet
figured out how to translate its military might into political
239power. Many readers of the New Stream excerpt will be left
hankering for Steel-like expression.
Fortunately, the Editors of International Rules provide a much
more approachable understanding of New Stream theory in their
three-page introduction to this area. 240 The Editors explain that
there are two "insights" of the New Stream Theory. First, the
theory posits that international law is not an objective enterprise1 41
but rather is based on ideology. Second, the theory suggests that
235 Id. at 243.
236 Id. at 245.
237 See INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 230 (Editor's footnote).
238 See RONALD STEEL, TEMPTATIONS OF A SUPERPOWER (1995).
239 See id. at 1-23, 121-39.
240 See INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 1, at 227-29.
241 See id. at 227.
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international law is essentially oppositional in nature. 4 2 It is
replete with inherent contradictions, and, therefore, manipulable
by decision makers.243 However, these "insights" are nothing more
than the application of Marxist and Critical Legal Studies
perspectives to international law. They lead New Stream theorists
to reject Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism because both
pretend to be objective. They also cause New Stream theorists to
focus not on regimes or even the substance of international law,
but rather on discourse. Nonetheless, the New Stream excerpt is
unlikely to add much intellectual value for most readers of
International Rules. It stands out from the other excerpts in the
anthology as unfriendly and empty, and the Editor's introduction
would have been sufficient.
B. Consider Post-International (Turbulence) Theory
The space devoted to New Stream theory could be better
utilized by including a selection from a new, exciting, and
substantively meaningful school of international relations theory
known as "Post-International" or "Turbulence" theory. This
theory is developed by James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee in
chapters two through four of their stimulating 1995 book, Thinking
Theory Thoroughly.2" Rosenau and Durfree argue that profound
changes with respect to three parameters-micro, macro-micro,
and macro-cast doubt on the"continuing vitality of both schools
of Realism.
The "micro" parameter concerns the skills of individuals
across countries.14' Rosenau and Durfee argue that individuals are
more competent than ever before at assessing their position in
world political affairs and the global economy, and they are now
better able to mobilize into collectives.2 6 For instance, individuals
have formed cross-border non-governmental organizations like
Amnesty International and Greenpeace in order to participate in
242
See id. at 228.
243 See id.
244 ROSENAU & DURFEE, supra note 22, at 9-69.
245 See id. at 34-35.
246 See id. at 35-36, 67.
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international human rights.2 47 They have also built cross-border
business empires in order to participate in overseas wealth creation
and distribution.2 48 The authors then assert that the improvement
in micro-level skills is largely due to technological advancements
that allow more information to flow more quickly to more places
than ever before. 49 Fax machines, e-mail, and the Internet are
obvious examples. Cable News Network (CNN), to take another
example, "is said to be on and continuously watched in every
embassy and every foreign office of every country in the world.,
250
CNN is followed by many non-diplomatic personnel in many
countries as well.
The "macro-micro" parameter refers to authority structures
(e.g., central governments) linking citizens and their collective
organizations to world politics and the global economy.251
Rosenau and Durfee point out that traditional authority structures,
to which individuals have habitually complied simply because
they were expected to do so, are in crisis. 212 Individuals and their
collective organizations no longer yield unquestioningly to the
dictates of a government.253 Rather, they assess the legitimacy of a
government using performance criteria and ask a Reaganesque
question: is government serving the people, or are people serving
the government? 24  When dissatisfied with the response,
individuals and their collectivities choose between one of two
strategies. 255  They either seek to relocate authority upward (a
centralizing tendency, exemplified by the European Union), or
they seek to relocate it downward (a decentralizing tendency,
illustrated, for example, in Quebec).256 Both strategies are clear
challenges to sovereignty, for no longer is it assumed that a
247 See id. at 66.
248 See id.
249 See id. at 46-47.
250 Id. at 47; cf id. at 64.
251 See id. at 34, 37.
252 See id. at 37-40.
253 See id. at 37.
254 See id.
255 See id. at 39.
256 See id.
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connection exists between the authority and sovereignty of a
state.257 As Mancur Olson suggests in his 1982 classic, The Rise
and Decline of Nations, special interest groups look to a state only
to obtain resources for themselves. 2 ' By implication, if they are
dissatisfied, they seek changes in the authority structure itself.
This challenge is particularly acute for governments in developing
countries. 2s9 Because their sovereignty is of the negative sort, they
are unable to address their problems successfully. As a result, the
gap between their people and individuals in developed countries is
wide and widening. People in developing countries are, therefore,
increasingly disinclined to express fealty to the governments that
have failed them.
The third parameter, the "macro" level, concerns the overall
structure of global politics and economics.2 60  While Realists
rightly observe that the world is anarchical, they incorrectly
presume a state-centric world dominated by sovereign, unitary-
rational states, which no longer exist.26 The world is now multi-
centric, and the Realists are wrong to disregard its features. The
skill revolution at the micro level and authority crises at the
macro-micro level mean there are two groups of actors on the
world stage: sovereignty-bound actors (SBAs), which are states,
and sovereignty-free actors (SFAs).263 SFAs include MNCs,
ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups, and political and interest
group movements.2 64 No longer are states the master of their own
existence.26 ' They are subject to capital inflow or outflow
257 There are several works heralding the demise of sovereignty and the end of the
nation state. See, e.g., KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE (1995); John 0.
McGinnis, The Decline of the Western Nation State and the Rise of the Regime of
International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 903 (1996).
258 See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS chs. 1-4 (1982).
259 See ROSENAU & DURFEE, supra note 22, at 54.
260 See id. at 34, 40-42.
261 See id. at 40-42, 58-60.
262 See id. at 60-61.
263 See id. at 40-44.
264 See id. at 40.
265 See id. at 48-49 (noting that the state has become "an instrument for adjusting
the national economy to the exigencies of an expanding world economy").
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decisions made by MNC managers.266 No longer are "local" issues
confined to localities.2 67  Environmental, criminal, and health
problems are not restricted by national borders. No longer do
people view their primary allegiance as owed to the state.2 6 They
identify with sub-groups along ethnic, religious, and linguistic
lines.269
Thus, in the Realist paradigm, SBAs interact reciprocally on a
270bilateral basis according to the rules of war or diplomacy. In
contrast, in the new multi-centric world, SFAs interact among
themselves and with SBAs in fast-moving flows, or cascades, that
271
stimulate still more interaction. While both SBAs and SFAs
seek to preserve their autonomy, security needs are just one of an
array of complex issues at stake.272 Military power is not obsolete,
but in fact states rarely employ violence due to the horrendous
consequences of war. Accordingly, the traditional Realist
instruments of power are giving way to economic, organizational,
and informational tools to achieve desired outcomes." In turn, the
number of subjects on which a crisis may erupt has proliferated. 74
Crises are not limited to threatened physical clashes (e.g., the Iraq
weapons inspection dispute), but may pertain to market access
(e.g., the openness of the Japanese market to imports),
environmental calamities (e.g., Chernobyl), threats to health (e.g.,
mad cow disease), or foreign exchange volatility and fears of
contagion (e.g.;, the Mexican peso crisis and the Asian currency
crisis).
In sum, there are simply more actors on the stage engaging in
266 See id.
267 See id. at 49-50.
268 See id. at 50-54.
269 See id. at 53-54.
270 See id. at 64-67.
271 See id.
272 See id. at 61-62.
273 See id. at 62-63. For a fascinating empirical study on the effect of the
distribution of power on war and international trade, which argues that the relationship
is not monotonic, see EDWARD D. MANSFIELD, POWER, TRADE & WAR (1994).
274 See ROSENAU & DURFEE, supra note 22, at 167-69, 172-75.
[Vol. 23
1998] INTERNATIONAL LAW & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 777
more behaviors with more underlying concerns than ever before.275
With skills improving at the micro level, authority being relocated
at the macro-micro level, and interaction patterns shifting at the
macro level, the inevitable result is global turbulence.276
International relations are not, for the Turbulence Theorist, just the
"same damn thing" repeated ad infinitum.277
Turbulence Theory is of great consequence for the
international legal theorist since it ascribes a more important role
to international law than does Realism. Turbulence Theory sees
international law bursting into new areas, and SFAs advancing
their aims and conceptions of justice through such law.278 One
such area is international trade law. To the international trade
lawyer, the Turbulence paradigm accords perfectly with global
trends. True, Members of the WTO are SBAs. But, their
interactions are influenced heavily by SFAs. This observation
leads to a third suggestion concerning International Rules, namely,
why not consider some of the theoretical discussions in the context
of global commerce?
C. Emphasize International Trade Law Applications
There are a number of points in International Rules where the
international trade lawyer may find herself wanting an application
of a theory to the lawyer's specialty. Such explorations would
give the anthology a more practical feel. Moreover, they might
increase the vitality of certain theories and affect the outcome of
some of the debates. Three possible applications are discussed
below.279
1. Whether International Trade Law is "Law"
One striking example is the discussion of Legal Positivism.
The post-Uruguay Round international trade law system seems to
275 See id. at 44-46.
276 See id. at 42-44.
277 Id. at 68.
278 See id. at 64-65.
279 For more information on the details of international trade law mentioned in the
examples below, see RAI BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
(1996).
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satisfy even Austin's narrow formula for "law." There is a central
legislature, namely the WTO Ministerial Conference. 20 There is a
central adjudicator, the WTO panels and Appellate Body.28' There
is a central enforcer, namely the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)
(i.e., the WTO Council meeting on a dispute settlement matter).282
A post-Uruguay Round rule is, therefore, a command of a
centralized body backed by the threat of retaliatory trade measures.
Perhaps Austinian Positivists will object that the WTO exists
only at the pleasure of sovereign states, and that its commands are
not really issued, interpreted, or enforced by a single sovereign
because states are themselves sovereign and thus not susceptible to
legal sanction. That objection simply means the basis for post-
Uruguay Round international trade law is the consent of the
addressees of the law, and consent (as distinct from morality) is
for Legal Positivists the source of law. Moreover, the objection
misses the practical reality that real workers and industries in a
target country will feel the effect of trade sanctions if their
government fails to comply with a WTO panel or Appellate Body
ruling. In other words, potential targets would not view
themselves as immune from international trade sanctions.
Likewise, the international trade lawyer will find the Kelsen
excerpt unbalanced. The entire analysis is in the context of the
laws of war. Furthermore, Kelsen argues that Grundnorm, the
idea that states behave as they always have, urges preservation of
the international status quo. The world of the international trade
lawyer, however, is one of global economic integration through
wealth-creating transactions. The nature, power, and wealth of
280 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. IV,
para. 1, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS:
THE LEGAL TEXTS 6 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
281 See generally Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicization of
International Trade Relations, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 775 (1996-97) (discussing the
evolution of international trade law). For a stimulating discussion of effective
supranational adjudication influenced by the New Haven School, albeit in the context of
the European Court of Justice and European Court of Human Rights, with applications
to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, see Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273
(1997).
282 See WTO Agreement, supra note 280, art. IV, para. 3.
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traders are in flux, and the rules by which they transact often
change, sometimes radically, but more often through evolution. In
other words, it is a world in which the laws of war are of little
every-day importance, and preservation of the status quo is a
laughable and foolish aspiration.
2. Whether International Trade Law Matters
Another example of where International Rules might benefit
from a greater focus on applications to international trade law is
the discussion about the relevance of international law to state
behavior. To an international trade lawyer, both Classical and
Neo-Realism seem primitive, pessimistic, and uninformed. States
may have behaved in the way these schools suggest during the
mercantilist period a few centuries ago, or even as recently as the
Smoot-Hawley Tariff era of the 1930s. But, since 1947, when the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)283 took effect,
states have paid greater attention to what international trade rules
say. More significantly, since January 1, 1995, when the far-
reaching and detailed Uruguay Round agreements entered into
force, WTO Members seem to be working much harder at
conforming their behavior to the mandates set forth in the
agreements. After all, if a Member breaches its obligations, it
cannot block adoption of adverse WTO panel or Appellate Body
reports, nor can it stave off retaliation by the victorious WTO
Member. Worse yet for the Realists, the international trade law
regime seems to belie the Realist premise of anarchy and non-
cooperation. Over 130 countries have joined the WTO,8 4 and each
thereby has committed itself to a single undertaking whereby it
accepts all of the multilateral trade agreements and hence foregoes
attempts at free riding. 2 5 In sum, the Classical and Neo-Realists
base a generalization about state interaction on observations about
public international law, with no understanding of contemporary
international trade law. Following the Cold War, economic
283 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. I, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
284 See WTO Web Site (last modified Jan. 14, 1998) <http://www.wto.org>.
285 See Jeffrey J. Schott, Challenges Facing the World Trade Organization, in THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: CHALLENGES AHEAD 3, 4 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 1996).
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growth and development have become the dominant concerns of
nearly every state. Thus, the Realists miss the mark because the
real action in international law is in the trade realm.
3. International Trade Law as a Regime
The discussion of Regime Theory is another place where
International Rules would benefit from a practical application to
international trade law. It seems indisputable that the world
trading system is a "regime," as it is a set of principles, norms,
rules, and procedures around which state expectations have
converged in a given area.286 There are norms contained in GATT
and the Uruguay Round agreements about the treatment of trading
partners, such as most-favored nation.2"7 and national treatment."'
Further, there are also rules in GATT and in these agreements
about maintaining and suspending such treatment 9 There are
procedures in the Uruguay Round Understanding on the Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, for instance,
about how WTO panels290 and the Appellate Body29' are to go
about adjudicating cases, how the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
292is to adopt panel and Appellate Body decisions, how WTO
Members are to comply with the decisions, 293 and what happens in
the event of non-compliance.294 If international trade law indeed is
a regime, then why not consider how and why the regime has
286 See Jock A. Finlayson & Mark W. Zacher, The GATT and the Regulation of
Trade Barriers: Regime Dynamics and. Functions, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 273
(Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (describing GATT as a regime and discussing its
features).
287 See GATT art. I.
288 See id. art. Il.
289 See, e.g., id. art. XXVII (allowing a contracting party to withhold or withdraw
concessions under certain circumstances); id. art. XXVIII (allowing modification of
scheduled concessions under certain circumstances).
290 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art. 12, WTO Agreement, supra note 280, Annex 2.
291 See id. art. 17.
292 See id. art. 16 (adoption of panel reports); id. art. 17, para. 14 (adoption of
Appellate Body reports).
293 See id. art. 21.
294 See id. art. 22.
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evolved, how the regime might become more coherent, and how
the behavior of WTO Members might become more consistent
with the regime? Why not consider whether the Uruguay Round
agreements, and for that matter the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), represents a change in or within the regime?
IV. The Death of Meta Theory?
International Rules is not for the lazy reader. Every page
requires careful attention, and some pages must be re-read to
appreciate the true depth of the points the author is making or to
see how these points relate to one another. There is no doubt the
effort is worth it, because this anthology identifies and discusses
great issues at the intersection of international legal and relations
theory in a very provocative manner.
One conclusion the reader of International Rules might reach
is that no single international legal or relations theory adequately
resolves all of the issues. For example, as one Neo-Realist admits,
Realism might be better suited for national security affairs,
whereas Institutionalism might be appropriate for international
economic matters. 95 Likewise, one Rational Institutionalist sighs,
"no -general theory of international politics may be feasible."296
There are too many different actors, state and non-state, involved
in too many issues, from sea-bed mining rights to carriage of
goods by sea, for one theory to work for all. But, to make life
more difficult for the theorist, increasingly the actors and issues
overlap. Human rights, cross-border pollution, and foreign direct
investment are hardly distinct matters any more.
Thus, perhaps International Rules is a harbinger of the death of
meta-theorizing, i.e., attempts to develop one model to explain all.
The anthology might provoke the reader to explore middle range
theories, which may be developed through a synthesis of
admirable features of existing meta theories, but which make up-in
explanatory or predictive power what they lack in grandeur. If so,
the Editors have performed a very useful service to this area of
study.
295 See Grieco, supra note 132, at 159.
296 Keohane, supra note 204, at 187.

